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Abstract—Smart toys have captured an increasing share of the toy market, and are growing ubiquitous in households with children.
Smart toys are a subset of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, containing sensors, actuators, and/or artificial intelligence capabilities. They
frequently have internet connectivity, directly or indirectly through companion apps, and collect information about their users and
environments. Recent studies have found security flaws in many smart toys that have led to serious privacy leaks, or allowed tracking a
child’s physical location. Some well-publicized discoveries of this nature have prompted actions from governments around the world to
ban some of these toys. Compared to other IoT devices, smart toys pose unique risks because of their easily-vulnerable user base,
and our work is intended to define these risks and assess a subset of toys against them. We provide a classification of threats specific
to smart toys in order to unite and complement existing adhoc analyses, and help comprehensive evaluation of other smart toys. Our
vulnerability taxonomy addresses the potential security and privacy flaws that can lead to leakage of private information or allow an
adversary to control the toy to lure, harm, or distress a child. Using this taxonomy, we perform a thorough experimental analysis of
eleven smart toys and their companion apps. Our systematic analysis has uncovered that several current toys still expose children to
multiple threats for attackers with physical, nearby, or remote access to the toy.
Index Terms—IoT, smart toys, security, privacy.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH smart toys set to grow to an $18 billion market by2023 (as estimated by Juniper Research), we set out
to classify the security and privacy threats they pose. Smart
toys, which have sensors and/or actuators and internet
connectivity, are in effect a subset of IoT. While threats
posed by IoT have been extensively studied, we argue that
smart toys present a distinctive attack surface because of
their unique target user group (children and teenagers). A
growing body of research shows that children harbor trust
and attachment for smart toys [12], [62], [63], [65], and the
effects of bugs and exploits in these toys are significantly
amplified due to such a vulnerable user base.
A child’s trust for her/his toy can be exploited in several
ways. A beloved toy may accompany a child wherever she
goes, allowing comprehensive location tracking, e.g., via
GPS or IP geolocation [33]. Bluetooth or WiFi enabled toys
may broadcast a static MAC address, further facilitating
location tracking. Children are inclined to trust their toys
and follow their lead [55], [61]. Our tests on the Sphero
BB-8 showed that an unauthorized person could control
the movement of the toy, potentially leading a child to
follow the toy into danger. Using Wiggy Piggy Bank, an
unauthorized person could issue rogue instructions to the
child, for instance directing her outside the home. In both
scenarios, the adversary could be within the Bluetooth
range, about 40 meters. Finally, children, who tend to have
wider trust boundaries than adults, are more inclined to
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share confidential and identifying information with a toy,
and less likely to understand how that information will be
shared and the consequences of sharing [30], [33]. Some toys
(e.g., Hello Barbie) actively solicit personal information, but
many toys (including all the toys we examined) passively
gather information, e.g., to infer usage patterns or improve
personalization. Toys that require creation of an account
online may collect additional information, e.g., email ad-
dress. Some toys are equipped with microphone or cameras
to capture audio, photo, and video—troubling enough if
leaked, but in the worst case scenario pose the risk of being
turned into an espionage device if an adversary can turn
them on at will [8].
As a vulnerable population, children are at risk of being
harmed by smart toy exploits. A child may be psycholog-
ically scarred if a trusted toy suddenly starts presenting
disturbing, violent, or pornographic content. For instance,
some of the toys we examined present content fetched
over an unencrypted channel, making them subject to being
maliciously replaced by a network attacker. A compromised
toy with a speaker can be made to voice distressing au-
dio [60]. Finally, a child can be harmed by any leak of
information captured by a smart toy. The harm may be
psychological; for instance, a child may experience a trusted
toy revealing information thought to be confidential as
a personal betrayal [29]. More saliently, it can result in
immediate personal danger, e.g., if it reveals the child’s
location to an attacker, whether directly or indirectly, while
others, like the disclosure of a child’s birthday (requested
by some of the toys we examined), can facilitate identity
theft, which may become apparent only much later when
the child reaches adulthood and the consequences are more
difficult to undo [35], [40].
Smart toys also share the vulnerabilities inherent to other
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IoT devices. Among these are the use of companion apps
and third party libraries, increasing a toy’s attack surface.
An insecure or over-privileged companion app may be
exploited to access the smartphone’s microphone, camera,
or GPS [37], or directly control the toy; any communication
between the toy and the app, if unencrypted, can also be
intercepted or modified. Toy makers may store personal
data insecurely or for an indefinite duration, increasing the
likelihood of a breach, as does the use of third-party ads
and analytics libraries [22]. Smart toy makers are also often
simply the makers of other general purpose toys, with no
particular expertise in information technology, particularly
information security. They may thus not fully understand
potential security risks to address them throughout the
product life cycle [45]. This includes development, design,
and testing phases, as well as after-market care, e.g., secure
firmware updates should a vulnerability be discovered [58].
Several classification schemes have been proposed for
general IoT security [1], [11], [26], [51], [71], however noth-
ing specific to smart toys. Some systematic analyses have
been conducted into compliance of children’s apps with
children’s privacy laws [31], [49], and experimental work on
selected smart toys specifically [7]. Some inroads have been
made into developing privacy paradigms for children’s
online activity and even into smart toys [32], [46], [70].
However, no taxonomy has been proposed that systemat-
ically addresses both the security and privacy of smart toys,
specifically, for experimental evaluation. In this work, we
examine eleven Internet-connected toys on the market and
determine what Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
they collect, what PII is shared with third parties like ads
and analytics servers, what steps toy makers take to secure
this data, and if the toy can be compromised in a way that
poses a threat to the physical or psychological safety of the
child using it. We also define a list of attacks categorized by
attacker proximity and assess the smart toys against them.
Traditional threat taxonomies devised for general IoT
devices do not, in our opinion, adequately address the
threats they pose to children specifically. Some threats we
present are specific to smart toys (e.g. parental PII protec-
tion), while others are given more emphasis (e.g. exposure to
third party ads and analytics services) compared to existing
taxonomies. Regulatory frameworks, like COPPA in the US,
that address children’s digital privacy specifically recognize
that children face unique harms from such devices, and are
designed to protect children against these threats.
We consider two broad categories of risk: breach of PII,
and unauthorized control of the toy. While there is no uni-
versal definition of PII [52], we have closely adhered to that
specified in COPPA, as the most widely applicable regula-
tion to specifically address children’s privacy [57]. We have
categorized PII into the following: personal information
including name, gender, physical address, email address,
telephone number, voice recordings, and photos; device
information, including mobile device unique identifiers in-
cluding IMEI, serial number, MAC address, IP address, and
smart toy ID; and service usage information, including ses-
sion start and end time, session duration, and app features.
Our findings show that popular smart toys are vulnerable to
several attacks in our taxonomy, some of them severely. For
example, in Toymail, we found that blocked contacts still
receive children’s personal information. Wiggy Piggy Bank
allows nearby adversaries to issue arbitrary tasks to a child,
in the familiar voice of the toy. Smart Toy Monkey sends
personal information unencrypted over HTTP to a server
located in China. VTech InnoTab MAX does not require any
authentication to access a child’s personal information.
Contributions.
1) We develop an experimental framework for evaluating
security and privacy of smart toys. The framework
encompasses PII collected and transmitted by smart
toys, and security measures that have been taken to
protect them; and PII collected and transmitted to third
parties such as ads and analytics services, and the third
parties’ TLS practices. Our framework relies on analysis
of network traffic (WiFi and Bluetooth), and reverse
engineering and code analysis of companion apps.
2) We investigate a representative, diverse set of eleven
smart toys using our experimental setup to expose
potential PII leakage, weak security measures, and
other vulnerabilities. Our methodology and tests can
be directly used for other toys on the market, and
extended/adapted for evaluating future toys.
3) We uncover, through experimentation, an excessive col-
lection of unique IDs that facilitate tracking children
across different services or platforms, and sending chil-
dren’s PII to unauthorized entities. Our results also
show that several toys expose children to threats that
may be exploited by physical, nearby, or remote attack-
ers.
As part of responsible disclosure, we have contacted
the manufacturers of all toys mentioned in this paper
and shared our findings with them. Wiggy Piggy Bank
responded quickly and mentioned that they are looking
into the vulnerabilities and possible fixes. Hello Barbie
responded that their technical team may get back to us “if
they have any concerns.” Anki Cozmo discarded our find-
ings, describing them as “unsolicited ideas.” We have also
received automatic replies from Osmo, Cloudpets, Sphero
BB-8, and Toymail; the rest have not responded even after
6 months. Overall, most responses (and lack thereof) indi-
cate that these companies take privacy matters much more
frivolously than expected.
2 RELATED WORK
Smart electronics for children have made the news for
security breaches numerous times in the past; e.g., see
Rapid7 [47] (strangers could hack baby monitors to view
children sleeping and even talk to them directly), Nor-
wegian Consumer Council [16] (highlight dangerous se-
curity vulnerabilities in 3 toys: i-Que, My Friend Cayla,
and Hello Barbie), Motherboard [17] (strangers could track
children’s location and message them through the HereO
smart watch), and BBC [4] (German ban on Cayla in Febru-
ary 2017, branding it as an “illegal espionage apparatus”).
Like wearables for adults, many smart toys are Bluetooth-
enabled and accompany children outside the home, and pre-
vious research on fitness trackers has uncovered numerous
vulnerabilities such as location tracking [23].
Several security breaches involving the VTech InnoTab
MAX have been reported. In 2015, VTech’s Learning Lodge
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database, used by the VTech suite of children’s tablets,
suffered a severe breach, exposing the PII of 6.3 million chil-
dren’s profiles [27]. The breach was due to a combination of
insecure practices, e.g., PII was sent in plaintext (no HTTPS),
the database was vulnerable to a simple SQL injection
attack, and account passwords were stored using an MD5
hash (no salting). The breach ultimately led to a $650,000
settlement with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission for
unauthorized collection of children’s personal information
and for failing to secure that information [59], and a related
finding from Canada’s Privacy Commissioner that VTech
was in breach of its privacy laws (but no corresponding
settlement) [43]. Also in 2016, the UK-based security firm
Pen Test Partners found that the VTech InnoTab MAX is
vulnerable to trivial data extraction [44]. (We found that this
flaw has not been fixed.) Later in 2016, it was found that
pornography could be easily accessed through the built-in
browser by using Google Translate, formerly white-listed
but since removed by VTech [24]. Rapid7 also found se-
vere vulnerabilities in the Fisher Price Smart Monkey, since
fixed [48].
Hello Barbie has been extensively scrutinized for its
privacy and security practices [14], [25], [38]. It encourages
children to divulge intimate details, which are then shared
with Mattel’s partner, ToyTalk, and with parents through
the web portal [29], [54], presenting legal implications if a
child discloses any physical or sexual abuse to the toy [34].
In January 2016, Somerset Recon Inc. [53] reported several
vulnerabilities in Hello Barbie, some of which are still valid
as we found (e.g., broadcasting an open hotspot and al-
lowing unauthorized configuration during pairing). Popular
brands of children’s smart watches have been analyzed by
the Norwegian Consumer Council, highlighting vulnerabil-
ities in all watches they examined [42]. In November 2017,
“Which? UK” issued a report examining common Bluetooth
vulnerabilities in children’s toys that allowed them to be
taken over by nearby attackers [64]. Given the stakes at
risk, the US Senate tabled a report on smart toy security
in December 2016 [39]. The following July, the FBI issued an
alert warning parents against privacy and security concerns
regarding smart toys [56].
Rafferty et al. [46] argue that the traditional access con-
trol model is insufficient to protect the privacy of children
using smart toys. They introduce a conceptual model for
smart toys, allowing parents to configure privacy rules and
receive notifications about sensitive data disclosure. The
model assumes that children are oblivious to privacy con-
cerns, and as a result, cannot adequately protect themselves
online or anticipate the consequences of leaking private
information to smart toy makers and other third parties.
Mahmoud et al. [32] propose an analytical framework
with 17 privacy-sensitive criteria to evaluate smart toy pri-
vacy practices. They analyzed the available privacy policies
and terms-of-use documents for 11 smart toys, and reported
potentially excessive collection of children’s private infor-
mation and lack of information on data storage location
and legal compliance. They also performed static analysis
of companion apps of these toys, and found most apps
to be over-privileged with the potential to leak children’s
private information. Our taxonomy, in contrast, offers a
classification of smart toy-specific vulnerabilities. We further
investigate the actual (as opposed to the potential) security
and privacy practices of a similar set of smart toys through
dynamic analysis by using the toys and apps in a realistic
scenario; our experiments measure PII collected by the toy
manufacturers and third-party servers, and uncover con-
crete security practices and vulnerabilities.
In summary, past work mostly involved isolated case
studies exposing vulnerabilities in an individual smart toy,
or analytical frameworks for smart toy privacy practices. In
this work we propose a taxonomy of vulnerabilities perti-
nent to smart toys, categorize them by attacker proximity,
and comprehensively assess a set of toys against it.
3 EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
Internet-connected toys must comply with traditional toy
safety regulations, and as online services, they must ad-
here to applicable digital privacy laws. Where there are
such laws, they tend to be more restrictive with respect
to children, in keeping with the common understanding of
children requiring greater legal protection. In what follows,
we briefly discuss EU and US laws and regulations, as
we also evaluate the toys in terms of following relevant
regulatory restrictions.
In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) governs how consent should be obtained when
collecting children’s personal information. Specifically, a
consent must be obtained by a parent or guardian for chil-
dren under the age of consent (13–16 years, varies among
the member states), and privacy notices should be written
in clear, age appropriate language [10]. Data collected from
children is otherwise subject to the same rules that apply
to any other EU citizen, including data transparency (the
ability of an individual to determine what data has been
collected about them), data erasure (the right to erase that
data, otherwise known as the right to be forgotten), and data
portability (the ability to obtain the data for reuse across
online services). The GDPR also mandates how companies
must respond in the event of a breach, and penalties may
be imposed for failing to report the breach to the applicable
authority and notifying the affected individuals in a timely
fashion. EU citizens do not have to reside in the EU to be
protected by the GDPR, even if they use services from a
company without any legal presence in the EU market [9].
In the US, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) governs data collection and online tracking of chil-
dren under the age of 13. Online services should take rea-
sonable measures to obtain parental consent to collect and
disclose information, clearly outline data retention policies,
and provide a means for data review and deletion. Under
COPPA, private information is defined to include persistent
identifiers like an IP address, which by default is included in
all TCP/IP traffic; thus, by definition, all internet-connected
toys collect private information. MAC addresses, like those
of a toy’s Bluetooth or WiFi interface, are also considered
to be persistent identifiers; in our tests, we have observed
MAC addresses transmitted to first party toy servers as well
as third-party analytics servers. However, merely collecting
persistent identifiers (absent parental consent) is not in and
of itself a violation of COPPA, if it is not used in conjunction
with any other identifying information, or if it is not stored
or made public, or if it not used for any other purpose than
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to ensure proper operation of the service (in this case, the
toy). If the toy or companion app contacts a third-party
analytics company, which then uses persistent identifiers
to build a profile of the child, or passively track the child
online, it is a COPPA violation, absent explicit parental
consent. Further, the toy’s privacy policy must explicitly list
all such third party companies [13].
Prior work has analyzed toys’ privacy policies for com-
pliance with these laws, and compared, through static anal-
ysis, the toys’ stated policies with the privileges requested
by their companion apps. Through dynamic analysis, we
have found excessive collection of persistent identifiers by
toy makers and ads and analytics services, and in some
cases, we also have found a clear violation of COPPAs
injunction against persistent tracking for the purpose of
advertising. In addition, while both COPPA and GDPR do
not explicitly address issues of security, we have found se-
curity vulnerabilities that expose PII to unauthorized parties
(e.g. unauthorized configuration and use), which violates
the spirit of such regulations if not their actual content.
4 ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
Most of the smart toys we analyze are intended to be used
with companion apps running on smartphones or tablets.
All the mobile apps we examine, and all toys with direct
connectivity, communicate with remote hosts. This presents
a wide attack surface covering toys, apps, remote hosts, and
the communication between each pair of these; see Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Smart toy attack surface
4.1 Security of PII collection and transmission
Toys that require the user to create an account typically
collect and store more PII than toys that do not. We audit the
network traffic of smart toys and their companion apps to
determine the PII they collect, transmit, and share with toy
servers and third parties, and whether those third parties
are ads or analytics servers.
We evaluate the security measures for protecting the
collected PII in local storage and when being sent to a
remote server. In some cases, we also verify that non-PII or
non-confidential content such as toy name and images (in
toy/web UI) are protected from malicious tampering. Data
transmission (including PII) can occur between the toy and
a companion app, a companion app and a remote server,
or, for toys with Internet connectivity, the toy itself and
a remote server. Additionally, data may be stored locally
on the toy or on the device hosting the companion app.
To investigate the confidentiality and integrity of data, we
assess the security of communications channels between
each pair of endpoints and local data storage mechanisms.
We determine the protocols used to communicate with
remote hosts (e.g., HTTP or HTTPS), and assess the likeli-
hood and severity of active man-in-the-middle attacks, from
replacing UI elements in the app with inappropriate content
to remotely controlling the toy.
4.2 Potential vulnerabilities
We define a list of potential vulnerabilities and assess the
smart toys against them. These vulnerabilities are grouped
by the proximity required to exploit them.
Physical access. The following vulnerabilities can be ex-
ploited by an adversary with physical access to the toy or
companion smart device.
No-local-PII-protection. An adversary can retrieve PII stored
locally in the toy’s internal storage, or within the companion
app, leaving it unprotected in the event the toy/device is
lost, stolen, or sold unsanitized.
Unauthorized-config-physical. An adversary can configure the
toy/device to maliciously forward PII to their account, or
issue harmful commands to the child.
Nearby access. These vulnerabilities require an attacker to
be near the toy (e.g., within WiFi/Bluetooth range).
Unauthorized-use. This vulnerability allows an attacker to use
the toy, for instance to remotely control it.
Unauthorized-config-nearby. An attacker can download the
companion app in his own device, then connect to the toy,
and maliciously configure it.
Unencrypted-hotspot. Some toys can toggle their WiFi adapter
into access point mode to allow a companion app to connect
directly to the toy and configure it. A toy’s hotspot should
authenticate devices that attempt to connect, and use an
encrypted channel. Otherwise, an adversary who connects
to a toy’s open hotspot can launch an MitM attack and sniff
PII in plaintext, or maliciously configure the toy.
Insecure-Bluetooth-practice. The use of static Bluetooth MAC
addresses allows a toy, and the child using it, to be tracked
persistently (cf. [23]). Also, accepting unauthorized Blue-
tooth connections by the toy allows adversaries to connect
to the toy and change its behavior, or launch an MitM
attack to sniff information transmitted between the toy
and the app (cf. [6]). Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) resolves
these two problems by MAC address randomization and
whitelisting [15].
Always-on. Toys that do not have power switches and in-
clude sensitive sensors or are connected to the Internet,
increase their exposure to potential attack, for instance by
continuously broadcasting a static MAC address.
Remote access. The following vulnerabilities expose the toy
to remote attacks.
Online-password-bruteforce. Some toys allow Web login to the
parent account. Login pages that allow unlimited number
of password trials could allow an adversary to brute force
passwords, particularly if they are weak.
No-remote-PII-protection. This vulnerability allows adver-
saries to access PII remotely without proper access control
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(e.g., allowing access to audio/video recordings through a
link, without any further authentication).
Weak-parental-PII-control. Some toys do not allow parents to
review or delete PII collected from their children, such as
voice recordings or pictures.
Exposure-to-third-parties. Third parties with whom PII is
shared, such as ads and anaytics server, may have inade-
quate measures to protect collected data.
Unencrypted-comm-channels. Information exchange between
different parties (toy, app, and hosts) may be susceptible to
interception through a MitM attack (e.g., if HTTP is used).
Insecure-session-cookies. Session cookies are used to automati-
cally log users in to their accounts. If they are not adequately
secured, for instance if they do not expire or the secure flag
is not set, an adversary may gain unauthorized access to the
parent account and to the child’s profile.
Insecure-TLS-practices. TLS vulnerabilities [66] may result
from using weak cipher suites, old TLS versions such as
SSL 3.0, and vulnerable extensions. We examine servers
contacted by the toy against protocol vulnerabilities such
as POODLE, CRIME, Heartbleed, and Ticketbleed [50], and
assess server certificates for security issues, including using
weak cryptographic keys and certificate mismatch.
URL-redirect. Web servers that are not hardened against a
URL redirect vulnerability could allow an adversary using
social engineering techniques to redirect users to phishing
websites (e.g., to steal their credentials). An adversary could
send links to users that appear legitimate (e.g., containing
the correct domain name), but that use special characters
to redirect the user to a malicious domain. Servers should
prevent URL redirect, or at least whitelist accepted URLs.
It should be noted that an ideal taxonomy of threats would
include other common web-based vulnerabilities, such as
those in the OWASP top-ten most critical web application
security risks. We have not presented these here as they
require more intrusive probing of the web sites in question
(e.g., cross-site scripting (XSS)), which for legal reasons,
require consent from the companies in question.
5 METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Using our threat classification model, we perform case
studies on eleven well-known smart toys, described in
Appendix A. We systematically assess the toys, their com-
panion apps, and the remote servers they communicate
with against our model. To obtain data for our analysis,
we systematically run the toys through typical use case
scenarios, using real mobile devices to circumvent evasion
techniques apps might use to avoid detection of suspicious
activity. Existing app analysis tools are used to detect the
servers the toys communicate with, the PII they transmit,
and the security measures applied by toy makers to protect
personal information. We augment these wherever suitable
by applying reverse engineering mechanisms, network traf-
fic analysis, retrieval of certificate private keys, and leaking
protection passphrases.
5.1 Experimental setup
We maintain two experimental setups. Our first environ-
ment uses a PC hosting Windows 10 professional 64-bit. The
PC is configured to use a MediaTek 802.11G WiFi adapter
in access point mode, using the 2.4 GHz frequency band
(the band used by the toys we examine), and a second NIC
with Internet connectivity. We examine the companion apps
using a Samsung N7100 hosting Android 4.4.2. This version
of Android is ranked among the top four Android versions
used in the wild [20]. As an older version of Android, it
is illustrative of how toys deal with older cipher suites,
TLS versions and TLS protocol vulnerabilities. Our second
environment uses a MacBook tethered via USB to an iPhone
providing Internet connectivity and configured to act as an
access point. Companion apps ran on iOS 10, both on an
iPad Air and an iPhone 7. We chose iOS 10 as it was the
latest iOS version at the time we began experimentation in
June 2017, and statistics show that the majority of iOS users
run the latest version of the OS [41]. We tested one group of
toys on an Android platform (Toymail, Wiggy, Barbie, CHiP,
and Cloudpets) and the other group on iOS (Sphero, Cozmo,
Ozobot, Osmo, and Monkey). We hope to expand on this
work in the future by performing a systematic comparison
of the latest versions of both platforms.
5.2 Network analysis
Both experimental setups use Wireshark1 to sniff network
traffic initiated by the toys and their companion apps.
To decrypt traffic, our first setup uses Burp Suite2 as a
MitM proxy and adds the Burp Suite CA certificate to the
smartphone CA store. Our second setup uses MitMProxy3
in lieu of Burp Suite, and correspondingly installs MitM-
generated certificates on the devices running the apps. We
address special cases where this approach was insufficient
to intercept and decrypt TLS communications. All such
interventions were performed on Android-based client apps
that were reverse-engineered. The Qualys SSL Labs4 testing
suite was used to perform TLS analysis on the server side,
and we examined packet captures in Wireshark to analyze
TLS practices on the client app.
5.3 Ads and analytics analysis
Wherever possible, we intercept data between the compan-
ion app and third party ads and analytics servers (Internet-
capable toys we examined do not directly communicate
with ads and analytics services). To determine the extent
to which this data can be used to uniquely identify the user
across multiple apps on the same device or across different
platforms on different devices, we created an account on a
selected analytics server, Flurry Analytics, used by two of
our toys, and wrote and deployed a dummy app to connect
to it. Using this method, we were able to determine that
Flurry Analytics used the same unique identifier on both a
companion app and our dummy app, despite the fact that
the vendor ID is different on both. This identifier can be
used to distinguish the user across unrelated services on the
same device. Other analytics servers we examined correlate
unique identifiers with users’ personal information such as
1. https://www.wireshark.org
2. https://portswigger.net/burp
3. https://mitmproxy.org
4. https://www.ssllabs.com
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email address, or use cross-platform cookies such as DSID
and IDE [19] cookies to distinguish users across different
platforms.
5.4 App analysis
All companion apps were analyzed manually (as opposed
to using, for example, the Monkey automation tool5). We
mimicked common use case scenarios with the goal of
triggering app UI events looking for signs of PII leakage,
weak security measures, or potential vulnerabilities, and
captured data from the interaction with the toy and its
companion app.
Modify custom CA store. When the companion app uses
a custom CA store to verify server certificates, we apply
the following methodology to force the app to accept the
MitM certificate: (a) Decompile the app using Apktool6 to
retrieve the CA store from the app’s assets directory, (b)
Patch parts of the app smali files to force revealing the CA
store password, (c) Use the password to access and update
the custom CA store, (d) Use the keystore explorer tool to
add the MitM certificate, and (e) Replace the CA store in
the assets directory of the app with the new store, rebuild
the app using Apktool, re-sign and verify the patched apk
file, and use the adb tool to reinstall it. As a result, the app
accepts the MitM certificate.
Exfiltrate client SSL certificate. In cases where the compan-
ion app authenticates to the server using a client Bouncy
Castle file (PKCS#12), which encompasses the client’s public
key and the client’s private key, we reverse engineer the app
to exfiltrate the PKCS#12 file and the passphrase used to
protect it. We then add the PKCS#12 file (the certificate and
the private key) to the interception proxy. This allows the
interception proxy to authenticate to the server.
Bypass certificate pinning. In cases where the companion
app uses certificate pinning to refuse server certificates
signed by any CA other than the one with the pinned
certificate in the app, we patch the corresponding parts of
the app smali files to disable this feature and intercept the
communication.
5.5 TLS vulnerabilities analysis
We assess toys, apps and server SSL practice to determine
potential TLS protocol vulnerabilities, and use Qualys SSL
Labs to determine TLS server parameters, including sup-
ported TLS versions, cipher suites and extensions.
5.6 Bluetooth analysis
BLEscanner7 is used to examine the Bluetooth connection
between the toy and the companion app, and determine
whether the toy’s Bluetooth MAC address is persistent or
dynamically changing. We investigate how an adversary
could tamper with the communication or gain unauthorized
access to Bluetooth parameters to conduct MitM or other
attacks [28]. The BTLEjuice tool8 is used to conduct MitM
5. https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html
6. https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool
7. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.macdom.
ble.blescanner
8. https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/btlejuice
attacks on toys that use Bluetooth to exchange data with a
companion app, to both sniff and alter the communication,
and RamBLE9 is used to modify BLE settings.
6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We systematically applied our threat classification scheme
to a sample of 11 popular smart toys on the market, varying
by target age range and functionality. In particular, the toys
we selected span multiple target ages, from Hello Barbie and
Smart Toy Monkey, geared towards younger audiences, to
what are generally thought of as STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Math) toys aimed at children 8+, such as
Sphero BB-8, Anki Cozmo, and Ozobot Bit. Toy functionality
encompasses AI capability,10 such as voice and image recog-
nition; sensors, like microphone and camera; mobility; and
wireless communication, like WiFi and Bluetooth. Detailed
results and analysis of individual toys are available in A.
Nine of the eleven toys we examined are vulnerable to
some form of attacks, whether through physical or nearby
access (within WiFi or Bluetooth coverage), or remotely,
such as over HTTP; see Table 1.
In terms of PII collection and contacting third-party
servers, all toys we examined collected PII, and 9 out of 11
communicated with one to four ads and analytics servers;
see Table 2. Alarmingly, the toys for younger children col-
lected PII more aggressively and frequently, including in-
trusive PII, such as cross-service and cross-platform unique
identifiers and user and devices fingerprinting information;
these toys also in general protected PII more poorly. One
such toy in our samples (Cloudpets) also displays ad in its
companion app. In contrast, toys for older children collected
less PII, generally did not require account creation, and had
more thoughtful security measures in place.
Table 3 shows the persistent user IDs collected by the
toys and companion apps. Apparently, some IDs captured
in the transmissions were obfuscated, or their purpose was
unclear. In such cases, we assume that if they appear across
multiple sessions, like an app ID, then they are deemed to
track the user across multiple sessions of the same app. All
the Android apps we tested (Toymail, Wiggy Piggy Bank,
Hello Barbie, Wowwee Chip, and Cloudpets) transmit the
Google advertising ID, even when ad tracking is disabled in
the smartphone. These apps, and those that transmit a hard-
ware ID, are deemed to track users across multiple services
on the same device. Finally, apps that use cookies such as
DSID and IDE on Android [19], or transmit email addresses
or other identifying information about the user to analytics
servers, are deemed to track users across multiple platforms.
On iOS apps, the smartphone’s advertising identifier was
not transmitted when the “Limit ad tracking” was disabled.
Table 4 shows types of PII collected by first-party toy
servers. Note that we exclude any PII stored locally on the
toy or smartphone. Multimedia may consist of audio (e.g.,
voice recordings), photos, or video, which may be recorded
by the user as part of toy functionality, or uploaded as
9. https://www.contextis.com/resources/tools/ramble-ble-app
10. For example, Anki Cozmo is marketed as an AI toy: “Anki
Cozmo, is an AI toy robot with a big brain and even bigger personality”
(https://www.anki.com/en-ca/cozmo (in the page metadata).
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Ads and analytics services contacted by smart toys and companion apps
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profile information. We consider a toy to transmit geolo-
cation only at street-level granularity or below, not above
(e.g., city). All the toys we examined transmit the user’s
public IP address, but in addition one (Toymail) sends the
private IP address of the toy on the local network. Toymail
is unique also in that it transmits the user’s Facebook ID and
the sleep/wake cycle of the child.
7 RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, we list our recommendations for makers of
connected toys, beyond following existing safety standards
and privacy regulations.
Fixing vulnerabilities. Toys, like other more generalized
IoT devices, should have a process for addressing vulner-
abilities. This includes a way to disclose vulnerabilities,
including: a formalized reporting mechanism, a simple link
to a form on their web site, or subscription to a bug bounty
program, like HackerOne (hackerone.com) or BugCrowd
(bugcrowd.com). At the very least, vulnerability disclosure
should not be discouraged by prohibiting under the terms
of use. There should be a short turnaround between iden-
tifying vulnerabilities and fixing them in the firmware or
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TABLE 3
Types of persistent user identifiers collected by smart toys
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app software where they are located. Finally, it is critical
to be able to push out new firmware or software updates
and patches as soon as they are available. There are ex-
isting mechanisms to update companion apps through the
corresponding Android or iOS app store, but pushing out
firmware updates to the toy is slightly more challenging.
Toys with Wi-Fi connectivity should periodically check for
updates, and companion apps should check at the launch
time for available updates. However, relying on the user to
manually launch the app extends the window of potential
exploitation between discovery of the vulnerability and time
it is patched, so it is preferable for apps to have push no-
tification functionality enabled. For this reason, companion
apps should request permission to push notifications on first
launch, and clearly state why this can improve the security
and safety of the toy. (It is also incumbent on the app to not
abuse the permission with unnecessary notifications lest the
user disable it.)
Limiting data collection, and improving storage and
communication security. Toys should limit the collection,
storage, and transmission of personal data to only what
is strictly necessary. Toys should not store personal infor-
mation such as voice recordings, photos, videos, or any
personal information that identify users/children, internally
on the toy’s flash memory; if it is necessary for toy func-
tionality, then it should be stored encrypted. Transmission
of personal information should always occur over secure
communication channels such as TLS. Toys and companion
apps should use TLS for all internet traffic, with strong
cipher suites and recent TLS versions (e.g., TLS 1.2), patched
against known TLS protocol vulnerabilities. Wherever pos-
sible, host whitelisting should be used, hard coded in the
smart toy firmware and the companion app, as it can miti-
gate phishing and MitM attacks. Certificate pinning can also
help prevent MitM attacks.
Securing Bluetooth and WiFi connections. Toys with wire-
less capabilities should take particular care to secure pair-
ing and connection. If the toy uses Bluetooth, it should
use Bluetooth encryption. Using open Bluetooth can allow
unauthorized access to the toy and PII stored on it. Toys
should also use dynamic Bluetooth MAC addresses to avoid
the possibility of tracking children’s locations. WiFi-enabled
toys should be provisioned in a secure manner, with WiFi
credentials supplied securely over an out-of-band channel.
Fine-grained access control. Toy companies that provide
links to PII on public servers, such as voice recordings,
should also grant parents the ability to select whether the
PII is public or private. Even when links are randomly
generated, if they are sufficient to access PII without any ad-
ditional authorization, it still can pose a privacy threat. We
also recommend allowing the parent to configure whether
such links are public or private, defaulting to private. Fi-
nally, these links should expire after a reasonably short
period of time.
End-of-life. Toys should provide a graceful means of scrub-
bing identifying and personal data in the event of end-
of-life, loss, theft, or transitioning owners. This may mean
restricting the amount of personal data stored locally on the
toy to only what is strictly necessary, and requiring some
form of authentication to access whatever data remains.
Toys that require the creation of online accounts tend to
collect more personal information than toys that do not, at
least in our sample, but also provide a convenient interface
for letting a parent log in through a browser and dissociate
the toy from the account if necessary. This ensures that
an unauthorized third party with access to the toy cannot
access the related account and any personal data stored
within it, or use it to communicate with the child.
Advertisement and tracking. We strongly caution against
ad display in companion apps, especially as these apps form
part of a purchased toy and thus should not require support
through ad revenue. In addition, ads and analytics services
should be used sparingly with children [3], and when used,
should not collect any PII. Various other measures can be
taken to protect the user’s identity when using analytics
services; Google Analytics, for instance, provides a means
of anonymizing IP addresses [21]. Flurry Analytics prohibits
the use of its services with children under the age of 13
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(in accordance with COPPA) unless its restricted feature set
limiting user profiling is used [69].
Apps should respect users’ request to disable ad track-
ing. This is an issue particularly on Android platforms.
Specifically, we observed multiple instances of Android
apps flouting the user’s preferred ad tracking setting, and
sending the ad identifier regardless of whether it was dis-
abled. By contrast, iOS app developers cannot access a valid
ad identifier on a device that has ad tracking disabled [2].
In the Android model, a single system call returns both
the ad identifier and the limit ad tracking setting, and the
developer is assumed to not abuse them [18].
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the security and privacy prac-
tices of eleven popular smart toys on the market. Our
findings show widespread use of data collection by toy mak-
ers and third party analytics servers, with almost all toys
embedding analytics services within their apps, and many
of them transmitting advertising identifiers even when ad
tracking is disabled by the user. Several toys do not take
adequate measures to protect sensitive data, and some toys
do not protect locally stored PII at all, making it trivially ac-
cessible to anyone with physical access. Children’s physical
safety may also be at risk, as all Bluetooth-capable toys we
examine advertise a static MAC address, making it possible
to track them through physical space. Finally, several toys
are vulnerable to exploits that can result in handing an
attacker control of the toy or some of its functionality,
potentially causing harm to a child.
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APPENDIX A
RESULTS ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SMART TOYS
In this appendix, we present individual case studies for the
toys mentioned in the main body of the paper.
A.1 Toymail
Toymail allows children to exchange voice messages with
parents, relatives and friends using the companion app or
another Toymail. Parents can configure the toy with an
approved list of contacts. Voice alerts notify children when
they have new messages, and they can click the play button
to listen.
PII collected and transmitted. The companion app sends
PII to app.toy mailco.com including login credentials; email
address; parent profile ID; child name, date of birth, and
photo; friend profile ID, name, and profile picture; and
voice messages. The app communicates with multiple ads
and analytics services which collect personal information
as follows. E.crashlytics.com collects smartphone device
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information and app crash information, along with smart-
phone hardware ID, Google ads ID, and app installation
ID. Api.branch.io collects smartphone device and OS infor-
mation, Toymail user ID, smartphone hardware ID, smart-
phone fingerprint ID, IP address, identity ID, and email
address. Api.branch.co verifies whether the smartphone is
a real device or an emulator. Wzrkt.com sets a unique ID
for the user which it collects while the app is running,
allowing tracking the user across different sessions. It also
collects the Google Ad ID (allowing tracking the user across
different services), smartphone device information, and tele-
phone service carrier information. Api.segment.io collects
Toymail user ID, name, email address, device hardware ID,
Google ads ID, smartphone device and OS information, data
network device status (WiFi, Bluetooth, cellular), and phone
carrier name. None of these ads and analytics servers re-
spects the device-wide ad tracking setting, and all collect PII
regardless of whether it was disabled. Unsurprisingly, we
found that using the toy resulted in targeted ads even on dif-
ferent platforms by setting unique identifiers (e.g., identity
ID) and correlating them with other personal information
(e.g., email address), as shown in Fig. 2 which depicts a
Toymail ad in a PC hosting Windows, on a different WiFi
network.
Once the toy connects to the WiFi network, it com-
municates with imp07a. boxen.electricimp.com to receive a
list of allowed contacts. When the child selects a contact
and presses the message button, the toy begins recording.
When the child presses the message button again, the toy
transmits the voice recording to the server, which stores
them in Amazon AWS storage. The toy keeps up to ten
voice messages locally which are received from parents and
contacts. It also stores Toymail child ID, toy ID, contacts’
names, and contacts’ Toymail IDs, in addition to WiFi SSID
and password.
Security measures. The app connects to all servers over TLS.
The app.toy mailco.com server certificate is signed by Go
Daddy and uses a 2048-bit RSA key. The app maintains its
own list of strong cipher suites, and uses certificate pinning
to prevent MitM attacks. It stores hashes of the certificate
chain public keys to bind the server certificate with the
original issuer. However, the toy suffers from a number
of Insecure-TLS-practices. The imp07a.boxen.electricimp.com
server certificate is signed by the custom root CA impca, and
both certificates are sent to the toy. The server certificate is
valid for 20 years and it uses a 1024-bit RSA key whose
certificate common name is different from the server’s do-
main name. The toy uses a client certificate to authenticate
to the server. It is signed by impca, uses a 2048-bit RSA
key, and is valid for 100 years. The app communicates
with two analytics and ads servers vulnerable to RC4 and
POODLE attacks, with support for SSL 3.0 and weak cipher
suites, exposing Toymail to Exposure-to-third-parties. Neither
the session cookie expiration date nor secure flag are set,
leaving the toy vulnerable to Insecure-session-cookies.
Toymail is rated to offer Weak-parental-PII-control. When
a child sends recordings to contacts other than the parent,
they are stored in the contact’s account, leaving the parent
without means to review or delete them. Even when a par-
ent blocks a contact from the child’s contact list, that contact
can still access the child’s personal information. The server
sends the child’s personal information to the contact’s app
accompanied by a “blocked” flag (equal to “-1”) indicating
that the recipient has been blocked. The app removes the
entry corresponding to the child from the app interface so
they can no longer exchange voice messages; however, the
contact still receives the child’s personal information each
time the app is launched including: name, date of birth,
photo, voice recording of the name, parent Toymail ID, toy
ID, wake up time, sleep time, and “isOnline” flag showing
the state of the toy.
With physical access to the toy, anyone can access these
messages and even add contacts to the contact list with-
out authentication, making it vulnerable to No-local-PII-
protection and Unauthorized-config-physical, respectively. In
fact, there is no mechanism to delete locally stored voice
recordings other than configuring the toy to use another
account.
Toymail is designed to be Always-on. Switching off re-
quires removing the batteries, accessible only by removing
the back cover using a screwdriver. Given that the toy in-
cludes sensitive devices like a microphone and is connected
to the Internet, we deem this a significant potential threat to
children’s privacy and security.
Fig. 2. Tracking example: Toymail tracking users across different plat-
forms - Toymail ad shown in a PC while the user is browsing Yahoo!
A.2 Wiggy Piggy Bank
Wiggy Piggy Bank is a Bluetooth-connected toy that allows
parents to set tasks, create goals, and send rewards to their
children through a companion app. Children are notified
they have new tasks either by the toy, which gives alerts
and states the tasks, or by checking their accounts through
the app. Children confirm through the app that they have
completed a task, and upon parental approval virtual funds
are transfered to their account. A child can set goals (e.g.,
buying a mobile phone for $100). When the balance of the
child’s virtual account achieves the target value of the goal,
the child may redeem it from the parent.
PII collected and transmitted. The app communicates
with the server api.kii.com, sending parent login creden-
tials (email address and password or session cookie), user
ID, children’s profile pictures, tasks set by parent, tasks
completed by children, and children’s goals. The app also
communicates with ads and analytics services. Unity3d.com
collects an app ID, device unique ID, user ID, session ID,
and device and OS information. Moreover, even when ad
tracking is disabled, unity3d.com still collects an advertising
ID uniquely identifying the user across different services,
and app usage information including app start time and du-
ration. The app also connects to google-analytics.com, which
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collects analytics data and applies obfuscation techniques
before sending them.
Security measures. The app’s connection to api.kii.com
appears to use TLS in a secure way. The app relies on the OS
trusted store to check the server certificate. The server uses
a certificate signed by well-known certificate authority (Go
Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2) and signed by a
2048-bit RSA key using SHA256. The server public key uses
a 2048-bit RSA key and the certificate is valid for a limited
period (expiring in October 2019). The server has six cipher
suites that support forward secrecy and they are at the top of
the server’s cipher suites list. The server is patched against
vulnerabilities including POODLE and Heartbleed, Ticket-
bleed, and does not support TLS compression, which causes
vulnerabilities like CRIME. Although the app uses HTTPS
to communicate with the server api.kii.com, the server does
not force using HTTPS in the case of flipping HTTPS to
HTTP, leaving all communication unencrypted, and making
the toy vulnerable to Unencrypted-comm-channels. We use the
Burp Suite repeater tool to flip all app requests to the server
on the fly to HTTP instead of HTTPS, and as a result, the
app connects to the HTTP version of the server and receives
PII in plaintext.
A determined adversary can take over a parent’s account
in several ways. The first scenario is a result of Insecure-
session-cookies. All session cookies expire January 19, 2038 - a
long period of time during which any adversary who steals
the cookies may use them to access the parental account. In a
second scenario, an Online-password-bruteforce vulnerability
allows an attacker to gain access to the parent’s account.
This was verified using the Burp Suite intruder tool to brute
force accounts owned by us. However, the most serious
vulnerability we uncovered, Unauthorized-config-nearby, en-
ables an adversary to access PII or assign tasks to a child
simply by being within Bluetooth coverage. Anyone within
Bluetooth range can install the companion app, pair with
the toy, and issue tasks, both new and predefined. These
new tasks would appear on the child’s account just as if they
had been assigned by the child’s parents. The toy announces
predefined tasks in what to the child is a familiar and trusted
voice, increasing the likelihood that the child will fall prey
to the attack. The attacker may also add a valuable (but
fake) reward to encourage the child to perform the task.
An adversary needs to take over the parent’s account (for
instance by brute forcing the parent’s password) to be able
to assign new tasks to the child, but does not need to do so
to assign predefined tasks, including some that encourage
the child to leave the house like “pull the weeds”, “rake the
leaves”, “take out the trash”, and “walk the dog”. The toy
also broadcasts a static Bluetooth MAC address, making it
vulnerable to Insecure-Bluetooth-practice.
A.3 Hello Barbie
Hello Barbie is a smart doll designed to conduct interactive
conversations with a child. The toy connects to the Internet
directly to send the child’s voice recordings to the toy server,
which applies voice recognition techniques to respond to the
child. The toy has a companion app that a parent can use to
configure the toy.
PII collected and transmitted. The companion app trans-
mits the following information to api.2.toytalk.com: the
smartphone manufacturer, device name and install ID
(unique per device), account ID (unique per user), app
version, user consent flag, OS name, and OS version (see
also Table 2). The app also sends login information in-
cluding email address and password, as well as the child’s
date of birth and any other important dates the parent has
specified. We did not observe traffic to any ads or analytics
services. The toy does not store the child’s voice recordings,
but streams them directly to the cloud. The toy stores the
WiFi network SSID and passphrase, as well as the parent
account ID that is used to access the parent profile and
listen to recordings. On the other hand, the app stores
sensitive information in plaintext, including a session cookie
authenticating the user to the toy server, the parent email
address, and profile ID.
Security measures. The app does not rely on the OS CA
store to verify the server certificate. The custom CA store,
which is included in the app’s assets directory, contains one
certificate for “Toytalk ca”, a self-signed certificate used to
sign the server certificate. In addition, the app uses a Bouncy
Castle PKCS#12 certificate to authenticate to the server. The
app connects only to servers in its whitelist; at the time of
testing, these were test.2.toytalk.com and api.2.toytalk.com,
although we did not observe any communication with the
first server, which seems to be for testing purposes. The app
communicates with api.2.toytalk.com over TLS using the OS
TLS implementation, which may contain weak cipher suites
or vulnerable practices specifically in older OSes such as
Android 4.4.
There are several scenarios in which an adversary can
exploit Insecure-TLS-practices to steal the parent’s credentials
and access the child’s recordings. The client, server, and self-
signed root certificates use RSA with 1024-bit keys which are
being phased out [36]. The server certificate private key can
be used to decrypt the negotiated session key, and the root
CA key can be used to sign certificates as api.2.toytalk.com
to steal the parent’s credentials.
The toy communicates with three servers:
firmware.toytalk.com, puppeteer.toytalk.com, and
storage.toytalk.com. When Hello Barbie is switched
on, it connects to the WiFi network and initiates a
connection to firmware.toytalk.com over TLS. While
the child presses and holds the “talk” button, Hello
Barbie streams the child’s speech over a TLS-protected
channel to puppeteer.toytalk.com. Once the “talk”
button is released, puppeteer.toytalk.com sends the
link to the new recording to storage.toytalk.com,
where it is stored. Analysis of the three servers
shows that two of them, namely firmware.toytalk.com
and storage.toytalk.com, support weak cipher suites
(TLS RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA with TLS 1.0).
Bhargavan et al. [5] found that ciphers using 64-bit blocks
(e.g., 3DES) are vulnerable to secret key disclosure.
The official website toytalk.com can be used by par-
ents to review the child’s recordings. The server certificate
uses an RSA 2048-bit key and is signed by Amazon using
SHA256 and an RSA 2048-bit key. The server does not
support weak cipher suites and uses cryptographic libraries
patched against known cryptographic attacks. However,
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there is no restriction on the number of login attempts,
and the login can be bruteforced. We exploited this Online-
password-bruteforce vulnerability during the course of testing
to bruteforce our own account. This flaw was originally
reported in January 2016 [53] and our experiments show
that it is still not fixed.
To investigate communication between the toy and the
app, we use the following specific setup for Hello Barbie. We
use two WiFi adapters on our test machine, one in AP mode
as an impostor Hello Barbie, and the second to connect to
the real Hello Barbie, exploiting its unprotected hotspot. We
route all traffic from the impostor to the real toy. In the app,
both toys, real and impostor, are listed, and we connect to
the impostor. The smartphone hosting the app, meanwhile,
is configured to forward all traffic through a Burp Suite
proxy. This configuration requires the app to be patched to
accept certificates signed by Burp Suite CA, and the app
client certificate bundle added to Burp Suite as the client
certificate. This allows the app to authenticate itself to the
toy, enabling us to intercept communication between them.
The toy authenticates to the app using a certificate issued
to 192.168.10.1, signed by “ToyTalk CA”, and valid to 2030.
Once the TLS handshake is complete, the app sends the
parent account ID and WiFi configuration, including WiFi
SSID and password, to the toy.
The toy can be configured using any companion app,
and no parent authentication is required to pair with the toy.
Because the toy uses the parent’s account ID as the sole way
to relate the child’s profile, including voice recordings, to the
parent, an adversary need only reconfigure the toy to use
the adversary’s account to access all subsequent recordings
made by the child.
There are several scenarios in which the toy is vulner-
able to Unauthorized-config-nearby. In the first scenario, an
adversary who knows the WiFi credentials can configure
the toy with their account ID; in the others, the adver-
sary does not require the WiFi credentials. While the toy
is in pairing mode, it broadcasts an open network with
SSID “Barbie-950”, making it temporarily vulnerable to
Unencrypted-hotspot. An unencrypted hotspot could allow
an adversary to conduct ARP spoofing, assuming a MitM
position between the app and the toy. In this scenario,
the legitimate toy and the app will unwittingly treat the
adversary as the destination for all traffic, allowing the
adversary to sniff the parent account ID and the WiFi
credentials. We deem this a minor risk as the vulnerability is
only present for a limited duration (during pairing), and an
attacker must be within close proximity. However, the toy
can be accidentally put in pairing mode during the course of
normal play, as it requires the child to simultaneously press
two easily accessible buttons on the toy. Once it is in pairing
mode, an adversary within wireless range can download
the app, configure the toy to connect to a different WiFi
network under their control, and then configure it to use the
adversary’s account.
A.4 Sphero BB-8
Sphero BB-8 is a Star Wars character-branded spherical robot
that can be remotely piloted via a companion app. The
Sphero BB-8 is one of a line of spherical robots designed for
both recreational and educational use. It can be controlled
programmatically using the beginner-friendly Sphero SPRK
Lightning Lab smartphone app, or a variety of both official
and unofficial SDKs for multiple platforms. The toy features
an on-board gyroscope and accelerometer, and is designed
to be controlled by compatible BLE-enabled devices. Al-
though Sphero BB-8 has been designed to be controlled in
a variety of ways, including programmatically, our study
focused primarily on the most common (and, to a child,
intuitive) scenario: running the companion Sphero BB-8 app
on a smartphone.
PII collected and transmitted. The Sphero BB-8 companion
app does not require the user to create an account, and does
not require a username or email address to operate. The app
prompts the user to enter their age, but does not solicit any
other personal information, and transmits a flag indicating
whether the user is under the age of 13, to both a Sphero-
hosted server at gosphero.com and to Flurry Analytics. The
age 13 is significant as it is the cut-off age for COPPA rules.
However, we did not find that indicating an age under 13
had any other impact on either the frequency or content
of communications between the app and servers hosted
either by Sphero or third-parties. Regardless of whether the
user was identified as being under 13, the app transmits a
unique app identifier and the MAC address of the toy. Other
than analytics data, the app communicates primarily with
sphero.com and gosphero.com. The app queries sphero.com
for firmware updates and media files for use within the
app, some of which are hosted on Amazon AWS. It sends
detailed toy usage data to gosphero.com, including a unique
app ID that remains constant across multiple deletions and
re-installations of the software; the toy’s Bluetooth MAC
address; and timestamped events related to toy speed and
collisions. The timing of these transmissions suggests they
are event-based, triggered by, for instance, toy collisions.
The Sphero BB-8 app sends analytics data to Flurry
Analytics (formerly Data Flurry), a subsidiary of Yahoo!.
While toy-specific data, such as speed and collision data,
is sent to gosphero.com, app-specific data, such as buttons
pressed, commands accessed, and slider values, are sent
to Flurry Analytics. Each HTTP post to Flurry Analytics
includes a device-wide Flurry ID, a unique app ID, and
the MAC address of the toy. The Flurry ID is unique to
the device, even across unrelated apps by different devel-
opers, all using Flurry Analytics. By default, each call to
Flurry Analytics sends richly detailed device information,
including: processor; OS; memory, disk, and battery usage;
and geographical location such as time zone, locale, and city.
Flurry Analytics’ ToS prohibits developers from sending PII,
such as a user’s ID and email address, unless it is crypto-
graphically obscured using a one-way hashing function [67].
However, the granularity of the data captured by Flurry
Analytics can be used to fingerprint the device and track
user behavior across different apps on the same device that
also use Flurry Analytics’ services. Flurry Analytics’ web
site states that it uses this data to build a demographic
profile of the app user, grouping users into such niche
demographics as “Business Travelers, Pet Owners, and New
Moms, among many others” [68]. At launch, the Sphero BB-
8 app sends device hardware information to app gaming
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bb8.connect(function() {
// roll BB-8 in a random direction, changing
direction every second
setInterval(function() {
var direction = Math.floor(Math.random() * 360);
bb8.roll(150,direction);
// set a random color
bb.randomColor();
}, 1000);
});
Listing 1. Snippet of node.js code to control BB-8
engine Unity 3D (unity3d.com).
Security measures. The Sphero BB-8 can only be controlled
via BLE. The companion app only allows Bluetooth pairing
with Sphero BB-8 when the device running the app is within
close proximity to Sphero BB-8. Simply being within BLE
range is insufficient to pair with the toy when using the
companion app; in general, proximity pairing requires the
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), a measure of the
strength of the signal between device and toy, to be within
a circumscribed range. We rate this practice as tending to
increase the security of the toy overall; however, the Sphero
BB-8 is subject to the Insecure-Bluetooth-practice vulnerability.
It broadcasts a static Bluetooth MAC address, which appears
to remain fixed over the lifespan of the toy, even across
power cycles - making the toy, and hence a child using
it, trackable. The toy advertises its MAC address over BLE
even when placed on its charging cradle and not in use,
maximizing the risk of unwanted detection. This flaw is
exacerbated by the Always-on vulnerability.
Only a single companion app can connect to a single
Sphero BB-8 at a time. However, any PC or laptop running
the Sphero BB-8 SDK can connect to the toy and control
it if it is within BLE range, regardless if the toy is cur-
rently maintaining an active connection with another de-
vice, a Unauthorized-use vulnerability. The only information
required to take control of a Sphero BB-8 using this method
is its Bluetooth MAC address, which is trivial to obtain
when the device is within Bluetooth range (given that it is
constantly advertising its presence). In our test scenario, we
used a node.js SDK to remotely pilot the BB-8 and make it
behave in an erratic fashion, rolling wildly in random direc-
tions and changing its on-board LED color unpredictably.
Listing 1 shows a snippet of node.js code used to control
BB-8 from an unauthorized PC. Our intent was to simulate a
scenario where a malicious actor outside visual range could
cause a child’s toy to behave uncontrollably, thereby causing
the child distress. Such an actor would only have to be
within a 33-metre range, the theoretical maximum range for
BLE. We do not rank this threat as either particularly likely
or particularly damaging, and it does not leak any privacy-
related information about the child to an attacker. However,
we can envision a scenario in which an attacker in a public
space uses this method to navigate the toy in the attacker’s
direction, prompting the child to follow the toy and be lured
towards the attacker.
A.5 Anki Cozmo
Anki Cozmois an intelligent programmable bot with on-
board speaker, camera, and inbuilt facial recognition.
Cozmo comes with 3 programmable, LED-colored cubes.
Anki Cozmo is interactive, and can be played with using
a companion app, or programmed via a Python-based SDK,
available on GitHub.
PII collected and transmitted. When the Anki Cozmo app is
launched, it transmits unique app and session identifiers to
HockeyApp.net, an analytics subsidiary of Microsoft, along
with device fingerprinting information such as the device
model, locale, OS version, and screen resolution. It also
sends obfuscated data to a server hosted on Amazon AWS.
Anki Cozmo does not require account creation to operate.
Security measures. Anki Cozmo engages in Insecure-TLS-
practices. The server hosted on Amazon AWS supports weak
cipher suites, including 3-DES, and 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
key exchange mechanisms, weakening perfect forward se-
crecy. Because Anki Cozmo can transmit a live video stream
via its onboard camera, we investigated what measures
were taken to harden it against attacks. A client device
running the companion app must connect to Cozmo’s wire-
less access point over 802.11g to establish a play session.
Cozmo’s SSID is broadcast only for a limited time when
placed in its cradle, after which it is no longer available to
connect. The network is secured over WPA2 Personal using
a 12-character alphanumeric shared passphrase displayed
on Cozmo’s LCD screen during the connection period. The
passphrase is fixed for each Cozmo, does not vary over time,
and cannot be changed, making this practice slightly less
secure than it could be otherwise. The companion app host
device does not have Internet connectivity during a play
session as it is connected to Cozmo’s hotspot, so even a
compromised device running the Cozmo companion app
has a minimal risk of re-transmitting a live video feed to an
attacker’s web site unless it is somehow stored locally for
re-broadcast later, a scenario we regard as unlikely. Cozmo
may be programmed from a desktop or laptop computer
using the Python SDK under the following conditions: the
computer must connect via USB to the smartphone or tablet
running the Cozmo companion app, and the companion
app must be explicitly configured to run in SDK mode.
In this configuration, only the smartphone and not the
computer connects to Cozmo’s access point. Furthermore,
only a single companion app can connect to Cozmo at any
given time. These countermeasures combine to minimize
the risk of an attacker surreptitiously intercepting Cozmo’s
video feed, even if they are in possession of Cozmo’s SSID
and password.
During an active play session, Cozmo connects to the
companion LED cubes over BLE. After the play session,
neither Cozmo nor the cubes continue to advertise over
BLE, minimizing the associated privacy risks. However, the
Bluetooth MAC addresses of Cozmo and the LED cubes are
static, increasing the risk they can be used to track a child.
A.6 Ozobot Bit
Ozobot Bit is a small bot with motors and an optical sensor
that detects and responds to changes in color of the surface
it happens to be on. The child “programs” the Ozobot by
drawing different colors on paper or on the companion app,
and the Ozobot spins, speeds up or down, and changes
direction accordingly.
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PII collected and transmitted. Ozobot Bit does not re-
quire account creation to operate, nor does the companion
app collect any personal information beyond what can be
acquired during normal app use. The Ozobot companion
app communicates primarily with analytics servers, and all
connections it initiates are over TLS. Ozobot posts analytics
data to unity3d, the app game engine platform, sending
app, user, session, and device identifiers; platform type and
version; the app-related event that triggered the post, such
as “appStart”, “appRunning”, “appStop”; and a timestamp
and local time offset. There are additional posts to app-
measurement.com, registered to Google DNS Admin, and
googleapis.com containing app and device identifiers.
Security measures. As no PII is collected beyond device
identifiers and analytics data, and there are no sensitive
sensors on the device, applicable security measures here
consist of proper TLS use. All servers contacted by the app
conform to proper TLS security practices.
A.7 Osmo
Osmo is modular, consisting of a suite of toys, each sold sep-
arately with a companion app developed for use exclusively
with Apple iPads. All toys in the Osmo suite use a mirrored
attachment that hangs over the front iPad camera in portrait
orientation, reflecting the surface in front of the iPad as it sits
upright on a base. The child’s interaction with the Osmo toy
on this surface is captured by the camera and processed by
the companion app in a module-specific way. We performed
tests on Osmo Tangram, Numbers, and Letters.
PII collected and transmitted. Osmo toys do not themselves
have any sensors, but require the companion app to have
permission to access the camera. Because the app is used
with the Osmo reflector, during active use the front camera
transmits only the surface in front of the iPad. Like Ozobot
Bit, Osmo does not require account creation to operate, nor
does the companion app collect any personal information
beyond what can be acquired during normal app use. All
connections initiated by the Osmo companion app are over
TLS. The Osmo app connects to playosmo.com, sending
a persistent identifier and retrieving dynamic localizations
displayed in the app interface. It sends analytics data to
tangible-analytics.appspot.com using the same persistent
identifier sent to playosmo.com, as well as obfuscated ses-
sion state data.
Security measures. As no PII is collected or sent to Osmo-
hosted servers beyond device identifier and other analytics
data, and Osmo does not contain any sensitive sensors,
applicable security measures here consist of proper TLS use.
Both playosmo.com and tangible-analytics.appspot.com en-
gage in secure TLS practices, with proper certificates and
servers patched against common attacks.
A.8 Smart Toy Monkey
Smart Toy Monkey is one of a related line of Smart Toys by
Fisher Price. The toy is interactive, featuring a microphone,
speaker, and voice recognition, and an accelerometer that
detects if it is being thrown in the air. The toy has limited
image recognition, mainly for use with accompanying activ-
ity cards that can be used in lieu of the companion app.
PII collected and transmitted. On initial app launch, the
parent is prompted to create an account. The app scans
for available WiFi networks and asks the parent to select
one and input its passphrase. It generates an encrypted,
base64-encoded QR code to display to the toy, which scans
it using image recognition and connects to the WiFi access
point. Both the toy and the companion app communicate
with Crashlytics and smarttoy.org. The app transmits to
Crashlytics its status in response to app events such as
terminate, enter foreground, enter background, is inactive,
is active, along with device and session identifiers.
The app sends and retrieves extensive data from smart-
toy.org, sometimes megabytes of data in a single session.
On closer examination, we find that multiple times in a
single session the app retrieves a dictionary of hundreds of
words and phrases localized to English, German, Spanish,
Italian, and French. Some of these are misspelled, gram-
matically incorrect, inappropriate, and/or profane; exam-
ples include: “because their [sic] all dead”, “why are you
single”, “loading a gun”, “I was a victim” “his daddy was
a mummy”, “fuck you”, “motherfucker”, “bitch”. The toy
does not respond to these phrases when vocalized, and we
could not determine their purpose, but each instance of the
dictionary is 3 MB of ASCII text, and we observed 10 of these
transmissions in a single session. The toy contacts pro.ip-
api.com, a geolocation service, and sends device and user
ID to 42.121.18.150, a server registered to Caoyi in China.
Security measures. While the Smart Toy Monkey establishes
its own WiFi connection to a wireless access point, the
connection between the app and the Monkey is over Blue-
tooth. The Monkey broadcasts a static MAC address and
local name “STParent”, making it susceptible to the Insecure-
Bluetooth-practice vulnerability. The toy is susceptible to the
Unencrypted-comm-channels vulnerability. Some web traffic is
sent unencrypted over HTTP, including a request to the IP
address 42.121.18.150 located in China with user and device
ID in the query string. The user agent string from this HTTP
request reveals that the toy is running Android 4.4.2, build
KVT49L.
A.9 VTech InnoTab MAX
VTech InnoTab MAX is a WiFi-enabled tablet targeted to
children. It is based on Android 4.4.2 and features out-of-
the-box child-friendly apps and whitelisted websites. Web-
sites can be added to the whitelist only by an authorized
parent account. The tablet has a camera and microphone.
As a standalone tablet, the VTech InnoTab MAX is the
only toy we examined that does not have a companion
app. We installed our MitM proxy’s certificate through the
parent account interface and were thus able to intercept TLS
communication between the toy and remote servers.
PII collected and transmitted. The VTech InnoTab MAX
does not transmit any PII to either VTech servers or ads and
analytics servers during normal, non-web browsing use. As
an Android-based tablet, it persists to local storage data
generated during each user session, such as logs, images,
notes, and videos.
Security measures. The VTech InnoTab MAX suffers from a
number of No-local-PII-protection vulnerabilities. Children’s
profiles on the tablet are not password protected. In fact, the
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, MONTH YYYY 16
launch screen displays the usernames and avatars of all the
profiles configured on the device, and clicking the associ-
ated avatar logs in as that user, without any authentication
required. Once logged in, it is trivial to access and modify
all saved PII, including photos, videos, audio recordings,
and notes. However, with physical access to the device, it
is unnecessary even to log in. The device can be booted in
recovery mode and a root ADB shell obtained. By default,
a limited number of shell commands are available, but
we use the ADB utility to install BusyBox, an executable
available in APK format that combines pared down versions
of many common *nix utilities. Once BusyBox is installed,
we exfiltrate all personal data on the device, including
logs, photos, and videos for all profiles configured on the
device. Using the same mechanism, a malicious person can
alter or add photos and videos that include content that is
inappropriate for children. Additionally, using the root ADB
shell, we have copied the firmware image, modified it, and
successfully rebooted using the altered image. An attacker
with physical access to the device can alter the image in such
a way as to obtain a reverse TCP shell, with the ability to
turn on the camera at will. Finally, the vulnerability noted
by Pen Test Partners [44] is still present. All profile data is
stored, in unencrypted form, on a mounted internal SD card
(distinguished from the external SD card), shown in Fig. 3,
and can simply be removed.
The parent account on the tablet is protected by a simple
4-digit PIN that can be easily guessed, as there is no limit
to the number of login attempts, making it susceptible
to the Online-password-bruteforce vulnerability. We rank the
severity of this vulnerability as minor, as it requires physical
access to the tablet. Moreover, the VTech InnoTab MAX
suffers from the Unencrypted-comm-channels vulnerability.
While much of the communication between the VTech
InnoTab MAX and remote servers is encrypted over TLS,
some of it is not. Firmware updates are fetched over HTTP,
allowing a MitM attacker to downgrade the firmware image.
Alarmingly, many interface elements, such as icons and
other non-PII media displayed as part of the user interface,
are transmitted over HTTP, making them susceptible to a
MitM attack and replaced with inappropriate content.
Fig. 3. VTech InnoTab MAX internal SD card
A.10 Wowwee Chip
Wowwee Chip is a robot dog that responds to voice com-
mands and touch. Wowwee Chip comes with a Smart
Ball and Smart Bed that doubles as a charging dock, and
responds to commands from a companion watch called a
Smart Band or the Wowwee Chipmobile app.
PII collected and transmitted. The Wowwee Chip com-
panion app sends analytics and bug-related data to Flurry
Analytics and Crashlytics. Flurry Analytics collects a hard-
ware unique ID and ad ID, as well as toy usage infor-
mation, smartphone and OS information, telephone carrier
information, approximate location, and smartphone state
information including battery remaining percentage, battery
charging state, memory available, external and internal disk
sizes and available spaces. Crashlytics collects ad ID, app
installation ID, and smartphone device information, in ad-
dition to other obfuscated data.
Security measures. Wowwee Chip adopts strong TLS prac-
tices. The app does not use TLS 1.0, and the servers
are patched against POODLE, Downgrade, and Heart-
bleed attacks. Wowwee Chip is not vulnerable to CRIME
since data compression is not supported in the app or
the servers. The app uses its own list of cipher suites
which does not contain weak ciphers or short keys, and
it supports only TLS version 1.2. All cipher suites sup-
port forward secrecy. Flurry Analytics and Crashlytics
certificates use RSA 2048-bit, and are issued by well-
known issuers with secure signature algorithms. Certifi-
cates validity periods are limited, and they are not re-
voked. Although both servers support TLS 1.0 and a weak
cipher suite (TLS RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA112),
since they are not supported by the app, we consider the
app not to suffer from Insecure-TLS-practices.
On the other hand, Wowwee Chip is vulnerable to No-
local-PII-protection. All components of the toy can be paired
with the RamBLE utility without authentication, allowing us
to access and modify toy information that includes manufac-
turer name, model number, serial number, firmware revision
and battery level. An adversary could also modify the name
of the toy to something inappropriate, which would appear
in the app when the child or parent uses it to play with the
toy, as shown in Fig. 4.
The toy and all its companion components (Smart Bed,
Smart Ball, Smart Band) use static Bluetooth MAC addresses
that allow child tracking, leaving it vulnerable to Insecure-
Bluetooth-practice. It is likewise vulnerable to Unauthorized-
use since the connection between the companion app and
the toy is over unencrypted BLE. Any installed instance of
the app can pair with the toy and have access to full toy
functionality. A child can play with Wowwee Chip directly
without the need for an app, leaving the toy available for
Bluetooth pairing. This could be exploited maliciously if an
adversary is within Bluetooth range (about 33 metres). Such
an adversary could control the toy, navigating it and making
it perform activities such as Yoga or Wanna Play that could
injure a child, especially taking into account the weight of
the toy at 2.7 kg. An adversary could also make the toy
bark continuously by adjusting the wake up alarm, possibly
scaring the child.
A.11 Cloudpets
Cloudpets allows exchanging voice messages between chil-
dren, parents, and friends. The toy does not connect to the
Internet directly, but connects to a companion app through
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Fig. 4. Maliciously changing Wowwee Chip’s name
Bluetooth. A parent uses the app to create parent and child
accounts, and links the toy to the child’s account. The
toy receives a link request, appearing as red heart pulses;
pressing a button on the toy’s hand accepts the connection.
Through the parent account, parents can accept or reject
messages sent to or from the toy.
PII collected and transmitted. The Cloudpets companion
app connects to the server parse-cloudpets.spiraltoys.com
and transmits parent and child names, pictures, and dates of
birth; parent email address; friend names and profile photos;
and child voice messages, which are stored in the parent
account in the cloud. It connects to ads and analytics servers
which collect PII as follows. Googleads.g.doubleclick.net
sets DSID and IDE cookies, which link user activity
and feature targeted ads across different platforms [19].
Ads.mopub.com collects the unique device identifier and
sends it after hashing using SHA-1. The app also connects
to googleadservices.com and googlesyndication.com, which
initiate requests to googleads.g.doubleclick.net. The Cloud-
pets companion app sends these unique identifiers even if
the user disables ad tracking.
Security measures. The toy server suffers from
Insecure-TLS-practices. It supports only TLS 1.0, and
several anonymous cipher suites (e.g. TLS ECDH
anon WITH RC4 128 SHA) which allow accessing
the server without authentication and expose the app-
server connection to the risk of MitM attacks. Moreover, the
server is vulnerable to RC4, and uses weak key exchange
and common DH primes, increasing the risk of losing
forward secrecy for transmitted PII.
PII stored remotely, including audio files and photos,
cannot be accessed without authentication. All PII is trans-
mitted over encrypted channel; however, the server does not
force using HTTPS. Flipping HTTPS to HTTP sends PII in
plaintext, exposing the toy to the Unencrypted-comm-channels
vulnerability. The toy suffers from Insecure-Bluetooth-practice
as it uses a static MAC address and it does not apply BLE
privacy; a MitM could access communication between the
app and the toy.
The app displays ads that cover the entire screen at app
launch and periodically during use; some of them force
users to wait for several seconds before allowing them to
close the ads. Moreover, the app features a persistent ad
bar at the bottom or top of the interface which continu-
ously displays ads to the user. While many free standalone
smartphone apps are monetized through ads, it is unusual
to observe aggressive (or any) ad display in the companion
app of a purchased toy, and Cloudpets is unique in this
regard among the toys we examine.
